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 Labor Market Shocks and Early Social Security Benefit Claiming
Abstract 
Many job-losers suffer large and persistent losses in earnings capacity.  For displaced workers
who are age-eligible, one reaction to these losses is to begin claiming Social Security retirement 
benefits. We use administrative earnings records from the Social Security Administration’s
Continuous Work History Sample to study the impacts of labor market shocks among workers in 
their late 50s and early 60s on Social Security retirement benefit claiming rates.  We find that 
labor market shocks lead to current and future increases in the fraction of insured workers who 
initiate Social Security benefits at the earliest possible claiming age.  Moreover, once they
initiate benefits, early claimants continue to have low levels of earnings in all subsequent years.
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Nearly	  one out of three Americans claims Social Security retirement benefits at age 62, the earliest possible claiming age.1 Although	  the early claiming rate has trended downward	  over the	  past 15 years,	  it surged by four percentage points during	  the	  Great Recession	  and remains substantial at 31 percent	  in	  2012. Because retirement	  benefits are actuarially reduced for claimants who initiate benefits prior to their “full	  retirement age,” early claiming does not directly	  affect the solvency of the Social Security system. However,	  the lower benefit	  levels may lead to lower living	  standards and a higher risk	  of poverty	  for early claimants and	  their families (Gruber	  and	  Orzag,	  2003). Indeed,	  the average retirement benefit for early claimants in 2012 was only	  $1,148 per month (Social Security	  Administration, 2013) – just under the Federal poverty line for a family of two. One explanation	  for the	  early claiming of benefits is diminished labor market opportunities resulting from economic shocks such as job displacement. A large body of work	  has shown	  that	  workers who are displaced from a long-­‐term	  job suffer persistent losses in	  potential	  earnings	  (e.g.,	  Jacobson, Lalonde, and	  Sullivan, 1993;	  Von Wachter, Song, and Manchester,	  2009).	   These losses	  appear	  to	  be	  particularly	  large	  for those	  who	  lose	  a job during a cyclical downturn. Davis and von Wachter (2011), for example, estimate that male workers	  with significant previous job tenure experience losses of approximately 20% of their	  expected	  future	  earnings	  if they	  are	  displaced	  in a recession. 




      
          
 
 
         
              
            
              
              
                
            
              
               
       
            
 
             
                
       
            
               
         
           
            
              
 
               
      
For workers	  who	  have	  reached	  age	  62, one	  response	  to	  a negative earnings	  shock isto initiate early Social	  Security retirement benefits (see e.g., Coile	  and Levine, 2007).2 Toillustrate	  the	  strength	  of this	  response,	  Figure	  1 shows the fraction of people born from1934 to 1947 who began claiming retirement benefits at age 62, along	  with the annualunemployment rate in	  the years they	  turned 62. While early claiming rates have generallytrended down among later cohorts, this pattern was interrupted by the recession in theearly	  2000s – which impacted cohorts born in 1939 and 1940 – and particularly	  by theonset of the Great	  Recession	  in	  2009 – which led to a sharp rise in early claiming rates bypeople born	  in 1947.	   After accounting for long term trends the correlation between earlyclaiming rates and the unemployment rate at age 62 is a highly significant -­‐0.4.The simple patterns in Figure 1 may understate the long run effects of a cyclicaldownturn	  for two	  reasons.	   First,	  workers	  who are	  younger than 62 but experience	  anegative shock may “bide their time” in part-­‐time	  and lower-­‐wage jobs until	  they reachtheir	  62nd birthday and can file for retirement benefits. Thus, a serious recession may endup impacting early claiming rates for several cohorts – not just those who are	  on the cuspof eligibility	  for benefits.	   Second, to	  the	  extent that people	  who	  have	  started	  to claimretirement benefits face disincentives to work because of the Retirement Earnings Test,labor market shocks that push people into early claiming may lead to lower earnings afterage 62, further magnifying the costs of these shocks.In this paper	  we use administrative data from the Social Security Administration’sContinuous	  Work History	  Sample to study the effects of recent and lagged labor marketshocks on the rate of initiation of Social Security retirement benefit claims. We also




            
               
            
              
              
          
 
            
               
               
             
           
           
          
          
              
               
        
           
           
     
 
              
  
examine the patterns of earnings changes associated with early claiming and provideestimates of the impacts of early claiming on earnings after age 62. We focus on	  peoplewho were working at age 57 and not already claiming federal disability	  benefits	  by	  thatage,	  following	  them over the next 5 to 14 years (depending on their birth cohort). Toaddress concerns about worker mobility in response to negative shocks in their local labormarket, we assign each worker their location as of age 57.3Our analysis points to	  two main conclusions. First, there is strong evidence thatpeople who experience negative labor market shocks in their late 50s and early 60s arelikely to begin claiming Social Security retirement benefits as soon as they can. This isevident both	  from	  the downward trend in their earnings	  prior to age 62, and from thestrong correlation between early claiming and local labor market shocks experiencedbetween	  ages 57 and 62.	   Second, once they begin receiving	  benefits, early claimers havevery low earnings	  (typically	  less	  than	  $2500 per year),	  regardless of howmuch they wereearning in the years prior to claiming. Interestingly, the post-­‐initiation	  earnings	  of people	  who begin claiming benefits at age 62 are not very different from those who begin	  claiming	  at ages 63 or 64,	  while early claimants as a group are substantially different from thosewho initiate benefits on or after their FRA.
I. Social Security Retirement	  Benefits	  and	  the Earnings	  Test U.S. workers become fully	  insured for Social Security retirement benefits once theyhave	  earned 40 Social Security	  work	  credits. A worker receives one credit for everycalendar	  quarter	  in which	  total	  earned	  income	  from Social Security-­‐covered	  employment is




         
           
             
           
                   
                
             
           
              
           
         
   
 
            
                 
  
               
         
                 
              
         
           
            
          
 
               
                  
at least	  $1,220 (in	  2015).	  According to the Social Security	  Administration, about	  96 percentof the U.S.	  workforce is now covered by	  Social Security.	  A worker’s monthly retirementbenefit is based on	  his or her average indexed monthly earnings (AIME), computed overthe highest 35 years	  of earnings.	  A worker’s	  Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) is apiecewise linear function of the AIME. In 2015, the PIA is 90 percent of the first $826 of theAIME plus 32 percent of the amount between $826 and $4,980 plus 10 percent of theamount over $4,980. The percentages	  are constant from year to year while the “bendpoints”	  in the PIA formula are indexed to annual average wage growth.The PIA is the benefit payable if a worker initiates retirement benefits at the full	  retirement age (FRA).	   If benefits are	  initiated before the	  FRA, they are actuarially reducedby 7-­‐8	  percent per	  year,	  whereas	  benefits initiated after the FRA are actuarially	  increasedby a similar amount.4 For example, an individual	  with a full retirement age of 66 and whoclaims retirement benefits at 62 will receive a monthly benefit equal to 70 percent of his orher PIA.While the earliest benefit claiming age is 62 for all birth cohorts, the full retirementage is following	  a scheduled	  increase.	  Birth	  cohorts	  born	  in or before 1937 had	  an	  FRA of65. The FRA	  for the 1938 cohort was 65 and 2 months and increased by two months forsuccessive	  birth years through the 1943 cohort. The FRA is 66 for the cohorts bornbetween	  1943 and 1954,	  and will increase	  again in two-­‐month	  increments for the cohorts	  born	  between 1955 and	  1960.	  The FRA is 67 for all cohorts	  born	  in 1960 or later.	  Figure	  2 shows trends in	  benefit	  initiation by age for members of the 1934 through1947 birth	  cohorts	  in SSA’s Continuous	  Work History	  Sample who were employed at age




             
            
          
        
        
 
     
        
             
             
        
         
         
              
           
              
             
        
           
           
          
            
             
 





              
 
57 (see	  Section	  II for detail about these	  data). The most striking elements of the	  figure arethe linear decline in the	  fraction initiating benefits at 65 and the coincident	  increase	  in the	  fraction	  starting	  benefits	  at 66. The shift from age 65 to	  66 occurs	  for the	  1938 through	  1943 cohorts,	  which were the first birth cohorts	  affected	  by	  the	  scheduled	  increase in the	  FRA at a rate of two months per year.5 The figure also	  shows	  the steady decline	  in the	  fraction	  starting	  benefits	  at the	  earliest claiming age.	  Some of the decline	  may beattributable to the increasing actuarial penalty for early claiming that accompanied the risein the FRA, although the figure	  indicates	  the	  decline in claiming at age 62 may have pre-­‐dated the cohorts affected by the change in	  the FRA.	  Since the Social Security	  program’s inception, retirement benefits have beenreduced	  when beneficiaries earn substantial income after initiating benefit payments.	  Priorto the year 2000,	  a retirement earnings test applied to all beneficiaries under age 70.	  In2000, Congress	  removed the earnings test	  for beneficiaries at or above the full retirementage, but maintained the test for early claimants,	  presumably as a device to deter earlyclaiming.	   At present,	  the benefits of early claimants are reduced by $1 for every	  $2 ofearnings	  above	  the exempt amount ($15,720 in 2015) until the	  beneficiary	  reaches	  FRA6;from that point on,	  benefits are	  increased to compensate for the earlier	  withholding,	  at thesame actuarially	  fair	  rate used to adjust	  benefits for early	  or delayed claiming. Thus, theearnings	  test has	  no effect on the present	  value of benefits for a beneficiary	  with	  average	  life expectancy; it only affects the timing of benefit payments.	  That said, until recent	  years,	  the fact	  that	  earnings test	  withholdings are later restored in the form of higher benefits was




        
          
        
          
           
   
      
              
      
        
       
        
          
    
     
             
               
           
           
                
          
     
          




              
          
               
            
             
       
     
              
                
         
              
               
    
 
          
              
          
   
 
          
         
 
                
             
 
          
               
             
     
relatively large effects of the elimination of the earnings test, particularly among those witha high discount	  rate. In contrast,	  Gruber and Orzag	  (2003)	  find little labor supply	  effect	  formen and a small effect for women. Friedberg and Webb (2009) revisit the question usingpanel data	  and utilizing	  unexploited variation in the test from numerous changes in theexempt amount over time; they find that employment following the elimination of theearnings	  test in 2000 increased	  by	  about 2 percentage	  points	  at ages	  66-­‐69	  and	  3.5 points	  at age 65,	  and persisted in succeeding	  years.	  A more subtle issue is whether the labor supply behavior of early claimants isaffected even once they reach full retirement age and are no longer affected by the test.Gelber,	  Jones and	  Sacks	  (2013) find that Social Security	  claimants who suppressed theirearnings in order to avoid the retirement earnings test were slow to subsequently adjusttheir earnings when the disregard amount was raised or when the test was eliminated forolder claimants in 2000. 7 They ascribe	  this finding to the presence of labor market frictionsthat impeded the adjustment of earnings to policy changes. This and related evidence fromthe federal disability	  insurance	  system suggest that there may be a permanentdistortionary	  effect on earnings	  of early	  benefit	  claimants.8
II. Data and	  Summary Statistics Our primary data source is the Social Security Administration’s Continuous	  WorkHistory	  Sample (CWHS).	  The CWHS	  is a one-­‐percent	  sample of Social Security Numbers




           
            
            
         
            
           
        
             
             
 
          
        
       
         
              
             
           
          
               
    
         
       
 
             
           
       
issued from 1937 to the present time,	  and	  contains longitudinal earnings and employmentdata, limited demographic data, and the record of benefit	  receipt.	  We use data for the	  period beginning	  in	  1991 and ending	  in	  2009, the	  latest year of data	  available at the time ofextraction.	  Th earnings	  data in the	  CWHS	  are	  derived from SSA’s Master Earnings File(MEF), which includes annual earnings in both covered and uncovered employment fromInternal Revenue Service (IRS) FormW-­‐2,	  quarterly earnings records, and annual incometax forms. For 1978 and	  later years,	  the CWHS	  provides total	  earnings,	  including	  earningsin uncovered sectors and earnings over the annual maximum amount subject to SocialSecurity payroll taxes. Earnings in the CWHS	  are total annual earnings summed over allemployers.9 The demographic	  data come from SSA’s Numident file and the benefit	  receiptdata come from the Master Beneficiary Record (MBR).To identify	  geographic	  location,	  we merged our CWHS	  extract with SSA’sLongitudinal Employee-­‐Employer	  Data (LEED) file. The LEED file	  is a one-­‐percent	  sampleof SSNs for which wage and salary employment was reported and includes an employeridentification number for each employer from which an individual received earnings in ayear and the amount of earnings received from each employer. The	  LEED also	  includes	  employer state and county codes.	  For individuals	  with	  earnings frommore than oneemployer in a year, we used the geographic information of the employer at which theirannual earnings were highest.To measure local labor market conditions	  we	  use state	  annual employment counts(aggregated	  across	  all ownership	  sectors)	  from the Quarterly Census	  of Employment and




            
            
         
             
            
       
 
       
              
             
         
  
              
              
        
          
    
               
              
    
 
     
              
                
              
              




          
            
           
           
               
             
              
            
            
         
             
           
         
               
          
              
          
   
            
Table	  1 also	  presents mean annual earnings by age, expressed in 2010 dollars	  and	  top-­‐coded	  at $150,000 to minimize the effect of outliers.	  We code those with no Social	  Security	  earnings	  in an year after age 57 as has	  having	  zero earnings	  in that year.Importantly, yearly earnings	  in the SSA data refer to	  calendar	  years, so	  earnings	  at a givenage are in	  fact	  earnings for the year that	  age was attained (so, in the extreme, calendar yearearnings for someone turning 62 in December were primarily earned at age 61).	  Table	  1shows	  that at	  age 57, those who will claim retirement benefits at 62 have mean annualearnings	  about	  19 percent below those who will claim after 62 ($36,427 v. $44,956).	   Theslope	  of the	  age-­‐earnings	  profile between ages 57 and 70 is also markedly different for age-­‐62 claimants compared to later claimants. Mean	  annual earnings	  of age-­‐62	  claimantsdecline by an order of magnitude between	  ages 57 and 63 (from	  $36,427 to $3,127),	  withthe sharpest	  drops occurring	  between	  ages 61 and 62, and	  62 and 63,	  thus coinciding withbenefit	  claiming.	  From age 63 on,	  the downward	  trajectory flattens. Among later claimants,mean annual earnings decline by much less between ages 57 and 62 (from $44,956 to$36,420), but after age 62 mean earnings drop sharply	  each	  year	  until age	  66, after	  which	  the rate of decline attenuates.	  By age 70,	  mean annual earnings in both groups are verylow.	  




               
       
                 
               
           
             
              
     
     
           
            
         
             
         
    
            
           
           
             
              
                
              




                   
  
               
                
        
                
       
          
               
              
               
          
            
             
            
       
                
              
       
              
                  
             
               




                
          
          
              
             
             
                
        
          
         
            
           
    
       
               
            
      
            
            
           
       
          
         




        
 
      
         
         
         
              
         
          
             
       
                
        
         
            
         
     
               
            
          
                  
          
 
                
           
                
    
quartile	  4 persisting in the upper quartile at age 61.10 In general, more people transition toa lower conditional earnings quartile	  or to zero earnings	  over the	  pre-­‐eligibility	  years than	  transition	  to a higher quartile.	  Fully	  33 percent of people	  in the	  first quartile	  of prior	  earnings	  have	  no earnings at age 61.	  While substantially	  fewer in	  the higher quartilestransition	  to zero earnings,	  the percent with no earnings at age 61 is relatively high forthese groups as well—ranging	  from 18-­‐20	  percent.	  Among those in the higher quartiles	  (2-­‐4), a substantial	  fraction	  transition	  to a lower conditional	  earnings quartile by age 61;	  thisreflects both intensive margin changes in hours worked and also any wage reductionsassociated with job	  changes (perhaps due to partial retirement).	  The next panel of Table 2 shows mean real earnings by age for each prior earningsquartile.	  These data	  are also	  presented	  graphically	  in Figure	  5. Perhaps most striking	  of allis how the	  earnings	  profiles for all groups—and especially the highest	  earners—exhibitsharp slope	  changes at age 62,	  becoming steeper for about two years before flattening out.	  The result is a remarkable convergence in earnings across prior	  earnings	  quartiles	  by	  the	  time individuals are in their mid-­‐60’s.	  The bottom panel of Table 2 shows how the percent initiating benefits by age variesacross earnings quartiles.	  A surprising fact is that there are only	  modest differences in the	  percent claiming	  at each	  age across the earnings	  quartiles.	  For example, while 36.5 percentof people in the first quartile of prior earnings claim at age 62, so do 28.6 percent of those	  in the	  fourth	  quartile	  of prio earnings.	  Claiming	  at 63 or 64 is relatively	  uncommon across




               
             
             
      
       
             
           
                 
            
                
                 
          
           
                
             
            
   
              
             
             
        
                 
      




            
         
          
             
              
                 
          
        
                 
             
               
               
            
                 
      
       
            
          
          
         
               
             
       




               
        
              
           
          
          
                
          
              
              
  
                
            
                  
             
            
              
          
            
               
               
IV. The Effect of Economic	  Conditions	  on Early Claiming 




               
              
          
             
          
             
       
       
                
        
           
           
            
                
 
              
          
              
                 
              
               
              
                




              
       
            
                
         
         
             
  
              
                
              
             
                  
                
          
                
               
             
               
                 
  
           
           




            
                  
            
                
         
           
           
                
           
               
           
              
               
   
             
             
             
                 
             
              
demand side factors, consider the 4.5 percentage point decline in the national employment-­‐population rate in the US from 2008 to 2010. The models in Table 4 suggest that this fallmight have been	  expected to cause a roughly	  3 percentage	  point rise in the	  fraction ofpeople who initiate Social Security retirement benefits at age 62 which is in fact very closeto the actual rise observed in this time interval.
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Figure 1: Fraction Initiating Social Security Benefits at Age 62, and
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Figure 3: Earnings At Ages 57 to 70 By Age of Initiation of
 










                       
           
   
     
            
 






   
  














































Figure 4: Earnings At Ages 57‐70 By Age of Initiation of Social Security
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Figure 6: Earnings at Ages 57-70 By Quartile of Age '53-57 Earnings 
and A e of Initiation of Soc. Securit Retirement Benefits 
­









       






            
















                           
                                      
                             
                                 
                                         
               
          
    
     
   
     
      
      
     
       
       
     
     
     
     
     
       
       
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
      
              
                   
              
                
                    
         









Percent Male 52.5 52.7 52.4
Percent White non‐Hispanic 83.6 85.9 82.6
Percent Black non‐Hispanic 9.3 9.2 9.3
Percent Hispanic 1.2 0.6 1.4
Percent with Missing State 1.1 1.6 0.9
Age at Initiation of Retirement Benefit Claim
Percent at 62 30.8 100.0 ‐‐
Percent at 63 10.0 ‐‐ 14.4
Percent at 64 4.6 ‐‐ 6.6
Percent at 65 15.2 ‐‐ 21.9
Percent at 66 21.5 ‐‐ 31.0
Percent at 67 or later 18.0 ‐‐ 26.0
Mean Annual Earnings by Age (2010 dollars)
Age 57 42,333 36,427 44,956
Age 58 40,029 32,452 43,394
Age 59 37,616 28,328 41,742
Age 60 34,977 23,604 40,028
Age 61 31,945 17,946 38,162
Age 62 28,221 9,762 36,420
Age 63 20,698 3,254 28,446
Age 64 15,804 2,705 21,622
Age 65 12,027 2,382 16,311
Age 66 8,492 2,071 11,344
Age 67 6,020 1,733 7,924
Age 68 4,308 1,365 5,615
Age 69 3,127 1,050 4,050
Age 70 2,207 791 2,835
Number of Observations 227,148 69,861 157,287
Notes: sample includes people born between 1934 and 1947 (inclusive) who had positive Social
Security earnings at age 57, did not initiate a DI claim prior to age 58. State is obtained from
information on employer at age 57. Earnings are censored at 150,000 (in 2010 dollars).
Observations with no Social Security earnings are set to 0 earnings. All individuals are observed to
at least age 62. Later cohorts are only observed to 2009. Mean earnings by age for ages 63+ are for
people who reach that age on or before 2009.
                      
            
            
      
Table 2: Characteristics of Individuals by Quartile of Average Earnings, Age 53‐57











  Male  (%)  52.5  33.5  36.9  53.8  78.7
  White  Non‐Hispanic  83.6  78.6  81.3  84.8  87.9
  Black  Non‐Hispanic  9.3  9.6  11.3  9.9  6.4
 Hispanic  1.2  3.6  1.4  0.3  0.1
  Earnings   Quartile   At   Age  61:
  No  earnings  21.4  33.2  19.9  18.2  18.0
  1st  quartile  19.9  41.4  19.8  12.8  12.3
  2nd  quartile  20.6  19.5  42.7  15.3  6.1
  3rd  quartile  19.6  4.5  15.8  41.8  11.8
  4th  quartile  18.4  1.3  1.8  12.0  51.9
  Real   Earnings   by  Age:
  Ages   53‐57  (average)  42,333  11,515  23,999  40,910  81,952
  Age  58  40,030  11,749  23,129  38,906  76,279
  Age  59  37,617  11,296  22,178  36,787  70,874
  Age  60  34,977  10,814  21,008  34,382  65,155
  Age  61  31,945  10,201  19,573  31,556  58,775
Age  62  28,221  9,210  17,233  27,572  52,137
Age  63  20,698  7,246  12,609  19,613  38,523
Age  64  15,804  5,966  9,789  14,697  29,237
Age  65  12,027  4,812  7,601  10,954  22,146
Age  66  8,492  3,628  5,473  7,504  15,604
Age  67  6,020  2,765  4,003  5,222  10,910
Age  68  4,308  2,113  2,924  3,680  7,714
Age  69  3,127  1,600  2,168  2,624  5,559
Age  70  2,207  1,144  1,517  1,838  3,937
  Percent   Initiating Social    Security   Retirement   Benefits   at  Age:
  Age  62  30.8  36.4  30.5  29.3  28.6
Age  63  10.0  9.2  10.7  10.7  9.2
Age  64  4.6  3.9  4.7  5.1  4.4
Age  65  15.2  11.9  15.5  16.0  16.4
Age  66  21.5  25.2  21.4  19.9  20.5
   Age  67+   or  censored  18.0  13.5  17.2  19.1  20.8
Note: see notes to Table 1.
                                    




 Earnings  Earnings 
 Earnings
 (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 (8)
  Coefficients   on   Indicators   for   Age   of   Benefit Initiation    (Relative   to   Initiation   at   Age  65):
Initiate    Benefits   at  62  ‐77,412  ‐42,206  ‐109,951  ‐75,606  ‐178,441  ‐131,437  ‐413,803  ‐263,215
 (3039)  (2288)  (2635)  (2083)  (3060)  (2602)  (5753)  (4758)
  Initiate   Benefits   at  63  ‐56,452  ‐41,493  ‐77,782  ‐75,948  ‐130,090  ‐126,177  ‐335,839  ‐280,378
 (4405)  (3213)  (3564)  (2730)  (4156)  (3372)  (8239)  (6123)
  Initiate   Benefits   at  64  ‐42,051  ‐34,752  ‐50,695  ‐58,477  ‐80,347  ‐89,034  ‐228,402  ‐221,172
 (6032)  (4380)  (4829)  (3698)  (5434)  (4407)  (10696)  (7882)
  Other  Controls  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes
  Mean   Earnings   Age  57  10,585  23,236  39,641  78,490
  Mean   Cumulative  103,924  143,092  210,640  448,680
  Earnings   if   Initiate  at
  Age  65
  Number   of  Observations  8,123  10,084  10,469  10,317
                                                
                                                         
                          
                   
                        
                             
             
Table 3: Estimates of Effect of Early Retirement Benefit Claiming on Cumulative Earnings, Age 62‐70, 1935‐37 Birth Cohorts Only
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable in all models is undiscounted sum of real Social Security earnings from age 62 to age 70.
Other controls included in models in columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 are: real earnings at ages 57, 58, 59, 60, and 61 (5 variables), dummies for male gender,
white non‐Hispanic, black non‐Hispanic, and Hispanic race/ethnicity, and dummies for year of birth.
                           Table 4: Linear Probability Models for Initiation of Social Security Retirement Benefits at Age 62 
  Dependent   Variable   =   Indicator   for   Initiating   Soc.   Security   Retirement   Benefits   at   Age  62
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
 




























  Cumulative   Change   in   State  Employment





  State   Effects   (at   Age   57),   Year  Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
  Dummies for    Quartiles   of  Earnings
     Age  53‐57
 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
  Dummies for    Extended   Quartiles  of
     Earnings   at   Age   60   and   61,  Interacted
 No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes
 RMSE  0.5982  0.5982  0.5982  0.5674  0.5674  0.5674
                                                   
                                                        
                                                      
                         
                           
                           
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See Table 1 for description of sample. Dependent variable in all models is indicator for initiating regular Social Security benefits
at age 62. Mean of dependent variable is 0.306. Specifications in columns 4‐6 include full interaction of "extended earnings quartiles" at ages 60 and 61 (i.e., 24
dummies). The extended quartile takes on values of 0 for those with 0 earnings, and 1‐4 for individuals with earnings in the first‐fourth conditional quartiles of earnings.
                                 Table 5: Linear Probability Models for Initiation of Social Security Retirement Benefits at Age 62 or Ages 62‐64 
  By   Quartile   of   Age   53‐57  Earnings:
 All
 (1)
  Quartile  1
 (2)
  Quartile  2
 (3)
  Quartile  3
 (4)
  Quartile  4
 (5)
  Models   for   Initiating   Retirement   Benefits   at   Age  62:










Cumulative    Change in    State  Employment











  Models   for   Initiating   Retirement   Benefits   at   Ages  62‐64:
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Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See Table 1 for description of sample. Dependent variable in models in upper panel is indicator for initiating
regular Social Security benefits at age 62 (mean=0.306). Dependent variable in models in lower panel is indicator for initiating regular Social Security
benefits prior to age 65 (mean=0.541). All models include dummies for year of birth and for state of employment at age 57.
